164 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
164 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: TrueNAS NFS4 ACL repair + cross-container media PUID
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created: 2026-09-02
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updated: 2026-09-21
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type: tech
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namespace: personal
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tags: [truenas, nfs4, acl, midclt, arr, radarr, sonarr, jellyfin, transmission, docker, git]
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related:
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- "[[truenas-zfs-panic-recovery]]"
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- "[[arr-stack-taiga]]"
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- "[[watchlist-disk-overflow-fix]]"
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- "[[2026-09-21-bare-repo-push-permission-denied]]"
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---
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# TrueNAS NFS4 ACL repair + cross-container media PUID
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> Hard-won lessons from the 2026-08-31/09-01/09-02 TrueNAS restore-incident remediation. Mirror of skill `truenas-nfs4-acl-and-arrmultiuser`. Detailed incident log: `family/documents/vault-sync/2026-09-02-restore-privilege-scope.md`.
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>
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> **2026-09-21 addendum:** the same class of failure hit the **vault bare-git repo** (`/mnt/RED_2TB/storage/git/obsidian-vault.git`) — `git push` failed with `unable to write file ./objects/XX/…: Permission denied`. Root cause and the working midclt recipe are in the section «Bare git repo: push Permission denied» below.
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## Trigger
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Any "permission denied" / file not readable / git `loose object ... corrupt` / empty Jellyfin library on **TrueNAS SCALE** (acltype=nfsv4) after a zfs restore, OR wiring Prowlarr/Radarr/Sonarr/Jellyfin/Transmission so container-written files are readable by other containers.
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## Core facts
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- TrueNAS SCALE uses **NFSv4 ACL**, not plain POSIX. `ls -la` shows a POSIX mask that can mislead.
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- Read real ACL: `midclt call filesystem.getacl <path>`; write: `midclt call filesystem.setacl`.
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- **`truenas_admin` is FULL_ADMIN in midclt** → can chown/setacl without passwordless root.
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- Web UI ACL editing only works on zfs **datasets**, not arbitrary subdirs under one dataset → use midclt/CLI.
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- Post-restore a tree may be owned by wrong uid (e.g. 921 `transmission`) with files `mode 0000`.
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## The two big gotchas
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### 1. setacl takes ONE JSON with `path` INSIDE it
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`midclt call filesystem.setacl /path {…}` → `[EFAULT] Too many arguments (expected 1, found 2)`.
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Correct form:
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```
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midclt call filesystem.setacl '{"path":"/x","uid":950,"gid":950,"acltype":"NFS4","dacl":[...],"options":{...}}'
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```
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Jobs run async → returns a job id; verify `midclt call core.get_jobs` (state `SUCCESS`).
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### 2. stripacl does NOT remove DENY; full dacl replacement does
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`options.stripacl:true` reported `SUCCESS` but left the `owner@ DENY` ACE intact. Only passing a **complete dacl array** works — setacl treats it as a full REPLACE of the ACL.
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## NFSv4 DENY overrides ALLOW (the corrupt-object trap)
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A file owned by uid 950 carrying `owner@ DENY READ_DATA=True` cannot be read by uid 950 itself. Git then reports `loose object ... corrupt` — this is **ACL, not data damage** (data intact; root reads fine).
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Diagnostic trap: `git fsck` under **root** is clean, but fetch/push under the owning uid fails → ACL, not corruption.
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Broken files often show POSIX `mode 40` (`r--------`); healthy objects `750`.
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## Repair / cross-container recipe (linuxserver media stack)
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Goal: all containers run under ONE uid (950) so transmission→radarr/sonarr→jellyfin all read each other's files.
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- transmission: add `PUID=950 PGID=950` to env in `docker-compose.yml`. It mounts `storage`→`/mnt/storage`, download-dir `/mnt/storage/Downloads`.
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- radarr/sonarr/prowlarr/jellyfin compose: add `PUID=950 PGID=950` to each (retain `TZ`).
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- linuxserver s6 images (Entrypoint `/init`, `/etc/s6-overlay`) honor PUID/PGID natively. Default (unset) = runs **root** → creates root-owned files that 950-services can't read → always set PUID/PGID.
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- Recreate from proper folder: `cd /mnt/RED_2TB/docker/<svc> && docker compose up -d` (+`--force-recreate` if env changed). Verify daemon uid via `ps aux` inside container (process as `abc`/950 = applied). NOTE `docker exec id` ≠ daemon uid.
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- Simple datasets: recursive POSIX `chown -R 950:950` + `chmod` under root SUFFICE (ACLs were trivial). Use midclt/ACL only when non-trivial ACEs present (check `filesystem.getacl` → `trivial:true`).
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- Bare git repo with `owner@ DENY` on objects → full dacl replacement recursively (perms JSON like above).
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### GOTCHA 3 — root dataset traverse (Permission denied despite clean file ACL)
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After chown-ing all leaf dirs/files to 950, if a service still gets `Permission denied` reading `/storage/Movies/...` (or jellyfin FFmpeg exit 243), check the **root of the dataset** `/mnt/RED_2TB/storage` itself. In the restore it stayed `921:921` with `owner@/group@ ALLOW` but `everyone@ EXECUTE=False`. uid 950 (not owner, not in gid-921-group) falls under `everyone@` → **cannot traverse past the root** into the tree, even though every nested ACL is clean. Fix (root):
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```bash
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chown 950:950 /mnt/RED_2TB/storage
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chmod 750 /mnt/RED_2TB/storage # rwxr-x---: gid 950 = truenas_admin (containers' group) gets r-x traverse
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```
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Kernel needs EXEC (traverse) on EVERY path component. Diagnostic via `setpriv --reuid=950 ... ls` shows `Permission denied` on a dir whose `getacl` looks clean → suspect root/parent traverse. `stat` via root shows clean 770 but uid 950 can't ls.
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### GOTCHA 4 — transmission "all torrents No Data Found" after data migration
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If every transmission torrent shows `error 3: No Data Found` right after a container recreate/pool migration:
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- Check: `docker exec -u` fine to read? downloadDir & files present? If files ARE there and readable as uid 950, the error is likely **stale from daemon startup while traverse was blocked** (see GOTCHA 3).
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- `torrent-verify` on a single torrent does NOT clear it. Fix is trivial & non-destructive:
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```bash
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docker restart transmission
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```
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On restart the daemon re-validates → torrents clear (e.g. **254/255 instantly**). Leftover #1 → Verify Local Data in Web UI.
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## Bare git repo: `push` → `Permission denied` (2026-09-21)
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**Symptom:**
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```
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error: unable to write file ./objects/80/09a34e…: Permission denied
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To ssh://…/obsidian-vault.git
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! [remote rejected] main -> main (unable to migrate objects to permanent storage)
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```
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**Root cause — TWO independent defects in the repo's dirs:**
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1. **13 dirs had `drw-r-x---`** (owner `rw-` **without `x`**): repo root, `objects`, `objects/info`, `objects/pack`, `refs{,/heads,/tags}`, `branches`, `hooks`, `info`, `logs{,/refs,/refs/heads}`. Without owner-`x` nothing can be created inside. Fixed with `chmod u+x` on dirs only (files were all fine: `0 files without u+r`).
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2. **28 dirs `objects/XX/` were owned by `root`** with ACL `group@:r-x---a-R-c--s` (read-only for the group). Git runs as uid 950 (`truenas_admin`), not root → **cannot write**. This is the defect that actually blocked the push.
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**Why it happened:** `mcpvault` runs **as root** on TrueNAS — `/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python3 … mcp_stdio_watchdog.py … mcpvault /vault` (`ps aux` shows uid `root`). Every object it wrote landed root-owned, and `objects/XX/` dirs created by it were root-owned too.
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> ⚠️ **Do not confuse this with the Mac's vault.** This `mcpvault` belongs to a **second Hermes instance living on TrueNAS itself** (`/opt/hermes`), whose vault is `/vault` — **not** Alex's `~/obsidian` on the Mac. It is not "the agent's own MCP server". Both instances merely push to the **same shared bare repo**, which is why the collision happens. PID refs seen 2026-09-21: 13727 (`mcp_stdio_watchdog.py`), 13738 (`node … mcpvault /vault`).
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With the inheritance fix below, root-owned objects are no longer fatal (rights are inherited from the now-writable parent), but **the root instance is still a latent hazard** — restarting it as uid 950 removes the cause. Left as an open item.
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**What does NOT work:**
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- `chown -R 950:950` and `chmod -R g+w` via SSH as `truenas_admin` → **`Operation not permitted`** (uid 950 is not the owner of root-owned objects). `sudo` on TrueNAS **requires a password** (`sudo -n true` fails; unlike Kraken where `sudo -n` is passwordless).
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- `midclt call filesystem.setperm '{...}'` → `[EINVAL] Non-trivial ACL present … Option "stripacl" required to change permission`. **Don't reach for `stripacl`** — it tears the ACL down to POSIX.
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**What DOES work — `filesystem.setacl` via midclt (no root needed):**
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uid 950 can read and write ACLs through midclt. Read the current ACL, add the group perms, write it back. Reference implementation (`/tmp/fix_vault_acl.py` on TrueNAS, ~120 dirs, ~90 s):
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```python
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FOR each dir in [repo] + listdir(f"{repo}/objects"):
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cur = midclt("filesystem.getacl", path) # path as BARE STRING
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for ace in cur["acl"]:
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if ace["tag"] == "group@" and ace["type"] == "ALLOW":
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ace["perms"]["WRITE_DATA"] = True
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ace["perms"]["APPEND_DATA"] = True
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ace["perms"]["EXECUTE"] = True
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ace["perms"]["WRITE_ATTRIBUTES"] = True
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if ace["tag"] == "owner@" and ace["type"] == "ALLOW":
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ace["perms"]["EXECUTE"] = True # root-owned dirs had this off
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midclt("filesystem.setacl", {
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"path": path, "dacl": cur["acl"],
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"options": {"recursive": False, "traverse": False, "stripacl": False},
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})
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# setacl returns a JOB ID → poll core.get_jobs until SUCCESS/FAILED
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```
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**⚠️ midclt argument-form pitfalls (cost real time):**
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- `filesystem.getacl` and `filesystem.listdir` take a **BARE STRING path**, NOT `{"path": …}`. Passing an object gives `[EINVAL] path: Not a string`.
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- `filesystem.setacl` takes **ONE JSON object with `path` INSIDE it** (see gotcha #1 above) — the opposite convention from getacl on the same service. Easy to invert.
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- `filesystem.setacl` / `setperm` are **async**: they return a job id. Polling immediately returns state `WAITING` → looks like failure. Must poll until `SUCCESS`/`FAILED`. With ~120 dirs over SSH the loop outlives the SSH timeout — **run it detached** (`nohup … &`) and read the log later; the first SSH-timed-out run had in fact already applied the ACLs.
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- Passwordless `sudo` is available on **Kraken** (`sudo -n true` → ok) but **NOT** on TrueNAS `truenas_admin`.
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**Verification (cheap, do it before re-trying push):**
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```bash
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touch /mnt/RED_2TB/storage/git/obsidian-vault.git/objects/80/.wrtest && echo WRITE_OK
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```
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`WRITE OK` → push will succeed. Confirmed: `f9a5c2b..21505ec main -> main`, then a clean `git pull` on Kraken.
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### Durable fix with INHERITANCE (2026-09-21, applied — 291 dirs)
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The minimal recipe above (add perms to existing `group@` ACE) restores write for *current* dirs, **but the bug returns**: the next push by the root-owned `mcpvault` creates a NEW `objects/XX/` dir whose ACL is inherited from the *parent*, and if the parent's `everyone@`/`group@` lacks `WRITE_DATA` + inherit flags, the new dir is root-owned and read-only again → push fails again.
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Working fix = **full dacl replacement** (not per-ACE edit) with **inheritance flags ON**, applied to every dir:
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```python
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# perms granted to owner@ AND group@ AND everyone@:
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# READ_DATA WRITE_DATA APPEND_DATA EXECUTE DELETE_CHILD
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# READ_ATTRIBUTES WRITE_ATTRIBUTES READ_NAMED_ATTRS WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS
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# READ_ACL (and WRITE_ACL WRITE_OWNER DELETE for owner@)
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# flags on each ACE: {"FILE_INHERIT": True, "DIRECTORY_INHERIT": True,
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# "NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT": False, "INHERIT_ONLY": False,
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# "INHERITED": False}
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# call: midclt call filesystem.setacl '<one json with path + dacl + options>'
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# options = {"recursive": False, "traverse": True, "stripacl": False}
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```
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**Result:** 291 dirs processed, 0 failures. Note `filesystem.listdir <BARE STRING>` to enumerate (same convention as `getacl`), and each `setacl` is async — but 291 sequential dirs finished inside one SSH call (~2 min), no `nohup` needed this time.
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⚠️ **Caveat — the ACL was replaced, not proven functional yet.** The write-test `touch objects/80/.wrtest` was NOT executed (approval timed out). Verification was indirect: `git push nas main` → `Everything up-to-date`, and `git rev-parse HEAD == git rev-parse nas/main` (`177da1e`). That proves the *current* tree is in sync, **not** that a fresh root-owned object can be written. A real `touch` in `objects/80/` as uid 950 is still the definitive test.
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**Vault topology (for future sessions):** one bare repo on TrueNAS is the single hub. Mac pushes/pulls remote **`nas`**; Kraken uses remote **`origin`** — both point at `ssh://truenas_admin@mallexxx.duckdns.org/mnt/RED_2TB/storage/git/obsidian-vault.git`. Mac and Kraken never talk directly. Host `truenas` does **not** resolve as an SSH alias from the Mac — use `truenas_admin@mallexxx.duckdns.org`.
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## Docker network persistency (per-service compose)
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- `docker network connect <net> <container>` is LOST on recreate → declare `<net>` in the service's compose `networks:`.
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- Caddy must co-own a network with its reverse-proxy target. transmission Web UI works because caddy is ALSO in `transmission_default`; radarr↔transmission works because both in `media_net`.
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- `external: true` networks (media_net/caddy_default) aren't created by compose — if they vanish (pool rebuild), `docker network create media_net`.
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## Containers / uid summary (as of 2026-09-02, TrueNAS "Taiga")
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- prowlarr/radarr/sonarr/jellyfin: all running, all daemons under **uid 950**, project `arr`.
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- transmission: PUID/PGID=950, in networks `media_net` + `transmission_default` (both external).
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- Radarr/sonarr/jellyfin mount `/mnt/RED_2TB/storage` as `/storage` (NOT `/media` as on Kraken) → set radarr root-folder accordingly.
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