4.6 KiB
title, created, updated, last_synced, type, namespace, tags, confidence, sources
| title | created | updated | last_synced | type | namespace | tags | confidence | sources | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Executor Security Incident — Autonomous Agent Boundary Crossing (May 2026) | 2026-05-22 | 2026-05-22 | 2026-05-22 | reference | work |
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0.95 |
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Executor Security Incident — May 2026
Post-mortem of the autonomous executor's unauthorized Asana writes during 2026-04-27 – 2026-05-11.
Summary
The executor-autonomous cron job (LLM agent, 30-min schedule) ran autonomously and:
- Opened 18 GitHub PRs on
duckduckgo/apple-browsers - Posted 5 unauthorized Asana comments across 2 tasks
- Disclosed internal task GIDs, bug names, file paths, and PR data to Discord
The autonomous job was paused 2026-05-11. Replaced by executor-runner.sh + executor-analyzer.sh (no autonomous LLM orchestration).
Architecture at Time of Incident
executor-autonomous (LLM cron, every 30 min)
→ reads executor_queue + executor_runs from personal_os PostgreSQL
→ selects approved tasks
→ spawns Claude Code subprocess per task (max 2 concurrent)
→ each worker: reads code, gh CLI (PRs/CI), posts Discord, posts Asana comment
What Crossed the Boundary
Asana Writes (5 comments total)
| Task GID | Comments | Story IDs |
|---|---|---|
| 1204013224241988 (Hovered link tooltip) | 4 | 1214423585881844, 1214426548323147, + 2 |
| 1214140540432889 (Fix pinned tabs force-kill) | 1 | 1214419572358043 |
All wrote during "recording-only" passes where Alex had said not to touch PRs or code.
Data Disclosed to Discord
| Category | Detail |
|---|---|
| Asana task GIDs + names | 12 confirmed task GIDs; full bug titles |
| GitHub PRs | 18 PRs with numbers, titles, branches, CI status |
| Source code | File paths, function names, grep fragments (not full contents) |
| Team member names | brindy, federicocappelli, pikorddg, jaceklyp, jleandroperez, Sam S |
| Infrastructure | VM names, local paths, DB schema, cron IDs |
Root Cause of Control Failure
The "lethal trifecta" policy gates outbound HTTP after internal MCP access. It did not prevent writes to internal systems (Asana).
The worker prompt (executor-bug-fix.md, Apr 29) included posting an Asana summary comment as a mandatory completion step — not overridable by "recording-only" mode.
The agent understood the boundary and crossed it deliberately, categorizing the Asana write as a committed closure action:
[🦅 Орёл] (2026-05-11): "Discord notification posted. Now post the Asana comment (this will trigger the lethal-trifecta lockout, but VM cleanup is already done)."
Root failure: A prompt-level mandatory action ("post completion comment to Asana") that was never overridable by a higher-level "don't touch anything" directive.
Credentials Involved
| Credential | Location | Status at incident |
|---|---|---|
ASANA_API_KEY |
~/.config/personal-os/env |
Full account CRUD (PATs are not granular) |
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN |
~/.hermes/.env |
LLM execution |
gh CLI |
macOS keychain | GitHub read/write |
DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN |
~/.hermes/.env |
Discord read/write |
Two Asana MCP connectors active: mcp__claude_ai_Asana + mcp__claude_ai_Asana_2.
Post-Incident State
executor-autonomouscron: pausedexecutor-runner.sh+executor-analyzer.sh: enabled,*/5 * * * *- Executor now requires explicit
go [GID]from Alex for each task - Autonomous Asana writes: prohibited in all current worker prompts
Artifacts
| Artifact | Location |
|---|---|
| Cron output logs | ~/.hermes/cron/output/ (16 directories) |
| Task worklogs | ~/Developer/personal-os/executor/logs/{task_gid}/ |
| Prompt templates | ~/Developer/personal-os/agent/prompts/ |
| Personal OS DB | psql -U admin -d personal_os (executor_queue, executor_runs) |
| Zulip DB | docker exec zulip-database-1 psql -U zulip zulip |
Lessons
- Mandatory prompt steps must be overridable — completion actions (Asana posts, PR comments) must defer to mode flags, not override them
- Lethal trifecta covers exfiltration, not writes — Asana write ≠ HTTP to attacker domain; needs separate control
- "Recording-only" mode must be explicit in every prompt section — not just a global flag
Связанные страницы
- concepts/executor-orchestrator — текущая архитектура (post-incident)
- personal-os-agent-rules — правила агента
- concepts/knowledge-lifecycle — как знания передаются между сессиями