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TrueNAS NFS4 ACL repair + cross-container media PUID 2026-09-02 2026-09-21 tech personal
truenas
nfs4
acl
midclt
arr
radarr
sonarr
jellyfin
transmission
docker
git
truenas-zfs-panic-recovery
arr-stack-taiga
watchlist-disk-overflow-fix

TrueNAS NFS4 ACL repair + cross-container media PUID

Hard-won lessons from the 2026-08-31/09-01/09-02 TrueNAS restore-incident remediation. Mirror of skill truenas-nfs4-acl-and-arrmultiuser. Detailed incident log: family/documents/vault-sync/2026-09-02-restore-privilege-scope.md.

2026-09-21 addendum: the same class of failure hit the vault bare-git repo (/mnt/RED_2TB/storage/git/obsidian-vault.git) — git push failed with unable to write file ./objects/XX/…: Permission denied. Root cause and the working midclt recipe are in the section «Bare git repo: push Permission denied» below.

Trigger

Any "permission denied" / file not readable / git loose object ... corrupt / empty Jellyfin library on TrueNAS SCALE (acltype=nfsv4) after a zfs restore, OR wiring Prowlarr/Radarr/Sonarr/Jellyfin/Transmission so container-written files are readable by other containers.

Core facts

  • TrueNAS SCALE uses NFSv4 ACL, not plain POSIX. ls -la shows a POSIX mask that can mislead.
  • Read real ACL: midclt call filesystem.getacl <path>; write: midclt call filesystem.setacl.
  • truenas_admin is FULL_ADMIN in midclt → can chown/setacl without passwordless root.
  • Web UI ACL editing only works on zfs datasets, not arbitrary subdirs under one dataset → use midclt/CLI.
  • Post-restore a tree may be owned by wrong uid (e.g. 921 transmission) with files mode 0000.

The two big gotchas

1. setacl takes ONE JSON with path INSIDE it

midclt call filesystem.setacl /path {…} → [EFAULT] Too many arguments (expected 1, found 2). Correct form:

midclt call filesystem.setacl '{"path":"/x","uid":950,"gid":950,"acltype":"NFS4","dacl":[...],"options":{...}}'

Jobs run async → returns a job id; verify midclt call core.get_jobs (state SUCCESS).

2. stripacl does NOT remove DENY; full dacl replacement does

options.stripacl:true reported SUCCESS but left the owner@ DENY ACE intact. Only passing a complete dacl array works — setacl treats it as a full REPLACE of the ACL.

NFSv4 DENY overrides ALLOW (the corrupt-object trap)

A file owned by uid 950 carrying owner@ DENY READ_DATA=True cannot be read by uid 950 itself. Git then reports loose object ... corrupt — this is ACL, not data damage (data intact; root reads fine). Diagnostic trap: git fsck under root is clean, but fetch/push under the owning uid fails → ACL, not corruption. Broken files often show POSIX mode 40 (r--------); healthy objects 750.

Repair / cross-container recipe (linuxserver media stack)

Goal: all containers run under ONE uid (950) so transmission→radarr/sonarr→jellyfin all read each other's files.

  • transmission: add PUID=950 PGID=950 to env in docker-compose.yml. It mounts storage→/mnt/storage, download-dir /mnt/storage/Downloads.
  • radarr/sonarr/prowlarr/jellyfin compose: add PUID=950 PGID=950 to each (retain TZ).
  • linuxserver s6 images (Entrypoint /init, /etc/s6-overlay) honor PUID/PGID natively. Default (unset) = runs root → creates root-owned files that 950-services can't read → always set PUID/PGID.
  • Recreate from proper folder: cd /mnt/RED_2TB/docker/<svc> && docker compose up -d (+--force-recreate if env changed). Verify daemon uid via ps aux inside container (process as abc/950 = applied). NOTE docker exec id ≠ daemon uid.
  • Simple datasets: recursive POSIX chown -R 950:950 + chmod under root SUFFICE (ACLs were trivial). Use midclt/ACL only when non-trivial ACEs present (check filesystem.getacl → trivial:true).
  • Bare git repo with owner@ DENY on objects → full dacl replacement recursively (perms JSON like above).

GOTCHA 3 — root dataset traverse (Permission denied despite clean file ACL)

After chown-ing all leaf dirs/files to 950, if a service still gets Permission denied reading /storage/Movies/... (or jellyfin FFmpeg exit 243), check the root of the dataset /mnt/RED_2TB/storage itself. In the restore it stayed 921:921 with owner@/group@ ALLOW but everyone@ EXECUTE=False. uid 950 (not owner, not in gid-921-group) falls under everyone@ → cannot traverse past the root into the tree, even though every nested ACL is clean. Fix (root):

chown 950:950 /mnt/RED_2TB/storage
chmod 750 /mnt/RED_2TB/storage    # rwxr-x---: gid 950 = truenas_admin (containers' group) gets r-x traverse

Kernel needs EXEC (traverse) on EVERY path component. Diagnostic via setpriv --reuid=950 ... ls shows Permission denied on a dir whose getacl looks clean → suspect root/parent traverse. stat via root shows clean 770 but uid 950 can't ls.

GOTCHA 4 — transmission "all torrents No Data Found" after data migration

If every transmission torrent shows error 3: No Data Found right after a container recreate/pool migration:

  • Check: docker exec -u fine to read? downloadDir & files present? If files ARE there and readable as uid 950, the error is likely stale from daemon startup while traverse was blocked (see GOTCHA 3).
  • torrent-verify on a single torrent does NOT clear it. Fix is trivial & non-destructive:
docker restart transmission

On restart the daemon re-validates → torrents clear (e.g. 254/255 instantly). Leftover #1 → Verify Local Data in Web UI.

Bare git repo: push → Permission denied (2026-09-21)

Symptom:

error: unable to write file ./objects/80/09a34e…: Permission denied
To ssh://…/obsidian-vault.git
 ! [remote rejected] main -> main (unable to migrate objects to permanent storage)

Root cause — TWO independent defects in the repo's dirs:

  1. 13 dirs had drw-r-x--- (owner rw- without x): repo root, objects, objects/info, objects/pack, refs{,/heads,/tags}, branches, hooks, info, logs{,/refs,/refs/heads}. Without owner-x nothing can be created inside. Fixed with chmod u+x on dirs only (files were all fine: 0 files without u+r).
  2. 28 dirs objects/XX/ were owned by root with ACL group@:r-x---a-R-c--s (read-only for the group). Git runs as uid 950 (truenas_admin), not root → cannot write. This is the defect that actually blocked the push.

Why it happened: mcpvault (the Obsidian MCP server) runs as root — /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python3 … mcp_stdio_watchdog.py … mcpvault /vault (ps aux shows uid root). Every object it wrote landed root-owned, and objects/XX/ dirs created by it were root-owned too. The problem WILL recur unless mcpvault is restarted as uid 950. Left as an open item.

What does NOT work:

  • chown -R 950:950 and chmod -R g+w via SSH as truenas_admin → Operation not permitted (uid 950 is not the owner of root-owned objects). sudo on TrueNAS requires a password (sudo -n true fails; unlike Kraken where sudo -n is passwordless).
  • midclt call filesystem.setperm '{...}' → [EINVAL] Non-trivial ACL present … Option "stripacl" required to change permission. Don't reach for stripacl — it tears the ACL down to POSIX.

What DOES work — filesystem.setacl via midclt (no root needed): uid 950 can read and write ACLs through midclt. Read the current ACL, add the group perms, write it back. Reference implementation (/tmp/fix_vault_acl.py on TrueNAS, ~120 dirs, ~90 s):

FOR each dir in [repo] + listdir(f"{repo}/objects"):
    cur = midclt("filesystem.getacl", path)          # path as BARE STRING
    for ace in cur["acl"]:
        if ace["tag"] == "group@" and ace["type"] == "ALLOW":
            ace["perms"]["WRITE_DATA"]    = True
            ace["perms"]["APPEND_DATA"]   = True
            ace["perms"]["EXECUTE"]       = True
            ace["perms"]["WRITE_ATTRIBUTES"] = True
        if ace["tag"] == "owner@" and ace["type"] == "ALLOW":
            ace["perms"]["EXECUTE"] = True           # root-owned dirs had this off
    midclt("filesystem.setacl", {
        "path": path, "dacl": cur["acl"],
        "options": {"recursive": False, "traverse": False, "stripacl": False},
    })
    # setacl returns a JOB ID → poll core.get_jobs until SUCCESS/FAILED

⚠️ midclt argument-form pitfalls (cost real time):

  • filesystem.getacl and filesystem.listdir take a BARE STRING path, NOT {"path": …}. Passing an object gives [EINVAL] path: Not a string.
  • filesystem.setacl takes ONE JSON object with path INSIDE it (see gotcha #1 above) — the opposite convention from getacl on the same service. Easy to invert.
  • filesystem.setacl / setperm are async: they return a job id. Polling immediately returns state WAITING → looks like failure. Must poll until SUCCESS/FAILED. With ~120 dirs over SSH the loop outlives the SSH timeout — run it detached (nohup … &) and read the log later; the first SSH-timed-out run had in fact already applied the ACLs.
  • Passwordless sudo is available on Kraken (sudo -n true → ok) but NOT on TrueNAS truenas_admin.

Verification (cheap, do it before re-trying push):

touch /mnt/RED_2TB/storage/git/obsidian-vault.git/objects/80/.wrtest && echo WRITE_OK

WRITE OK → push will succeed. Confirmed: f9a5c2b..21505ec main -> main, then a clean git pull on Kraken.

Durable fix with INHERITANCE (2026-09-21, applied — 291 dirs)

The minimal recipe above (add perms to existing group@ ACE) restores write for current dirs, but the bug returns: the next push by the root-owned mcpvault creates a NEW objects/XX/ dir whose ACL is inherited from the parent, and if the parent's everyone@/group@ lacks WRITE_DATA + inherit flags, the new dir is root-owned and read-only again → push fails again.

Working fix = full dacl replacement (not per-ACE edit) with inheritance flags ON, applied to every dir:

# perms granted to owner@ AND group@ AND everyone@:
#   READ_DATA WRITE_DATA APPEND_DATA EXECUTE DELETE_CHILD
#   READ_ATTRIBUTES WRITE_ATTRIBUTES READ_NAMED_ATTRS WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS
#   READ_ACL (and WRITE_ACL WRITE_OWNER DELETE for owner@)
# flags on each ACE:  {"FILE_INHERIT": True, "DIRECTORY_INHERIT": True,
#                      "NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT": False, "INHERIT_ONLY": False,
#                      "INHERITED": False}
# call:  midclt call filesystem.setacl '<one json with path + dacl + options>'
#        options = {"recursive": False, "traverse": True, "stripacl": False}

Result: 291 dirs processed, 0 failures. Note filesystem.listdir <BARE STRING> to enumerate (same convention as getacl), and each setacl is async — but 291 sequential dirs finished inside one SSH call (~2 min), no nohup needed this time.

⚠️ Caveat — the ACL was replaced, not proven functional yet. The write-test touch objects/80/.wrtest was NOT executed (approval timed out). Verification was indirect: git push nas main → Everything up-to-date, and git rev-parse HEAD == git rev-parse nas/main (177da1e). That proves the current tree is in sync, not that a fresh root-owned object can be written. A real touch in objects/80/ as uid 950 is still the definitive test.

Vault topology (for future sessions): one bare repo on TrueNAS is the single hub. Mac pushes/pulls remote nas; Kraken uses remote origin — both point at ssh://truenas_admin@mallexxx.duckdns.org/mnt/RED_2TB/storage/git/obsidian-vault.git. Mac and Kraken never talk directly. Host truenas does not resolve as an SSH alias from the Mac — use truenas_admin@mallexxx.duckdns.org.

Docker network persistency (per-service compose)

  • docker network connect <net> <container> is LOST on recreate → declare <net> in the service's compose networks:.
  • Caddy must co-own a network with its reverse-proxy target. transmission Web UI works because caddy is ALSO in transmission_default; radarr↔transmission works because both in media_net.
  • external: true networks (media_net/caddy_default) aren't created by compose — if they vanish (pool rebuild), docker network create media_net.

Containers / uid summary (as of 2026-09-02, TrueNAS "Taiga")

  • prowlarr/radarr/sonarr/jellyfin: all running, all daemons under uid 950, project arr.
  • transmission: PUID/PGID=950, in networks media_net + transmission_default (both external).
  • Radarr/sonarr/jellyfin mount /mnt/RED_2TB/storage as /storage (NOT /media as on Kraken) → set radarr root-folder accordingly.