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| TrueNAS NFS4 ACL repair + cross-container media PUID | 2026-09-02 | 2026-09-02 | tech | personal |
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TrueNAS NFS4 ACL repair + cross-container media PUID
Hard-won lessons from the 2026-08-31/09-01/09-02 TrueNAS restore-incident remediation. Mirror of skill
truenas-nfs4-acl-and-arrmultiuser. Detailed incident log:family/documents/vault-sync/2026-09-02-restore-privilege-scope.md.
Trigger
Any "permission denied" / file not readable / git loose object ... corrupt / empty Jellyfin library on TrueNAS SCALE (acltype=nfsv4) after a zfs restore, OR wiring Prowlarr/Radarr/Sonarr/Jellyfin/Transmission so container-written files are readable by other containers.
Core facts
- TrueNAS SCALE uses NFSv4 ACL, not plain POSIX.
ls -lashows a POSIX mask that can mislead. - Read real ACL:
midclt call filesystem.getacl <path>; write:midclt call filesystem.setacl. truenas_adminis FULL_ADMIN in midclt → can chown/setacl without passwordless root.- Web UI ACL editing only works on zfs datasets, not arbitrary subdirs under one dataset → use midclt/CLI.
- Post-restore a tree may be owned by wrong uid (e.g. 921
transmission) with filesmode 0000.
The two big gotchas
1. setacl takes ONE JSON with path INSIDE it
midclt call filesystem.setacl /path {…} → [EFAULT] Too many arguments (expected 1, found 2).
Correct form:
midclt call filesystem.setacl '{"path":"/x","uid":950,"gid":950,"acltype":"NFS4","dacl":[...],"options":{...}}'
Jobs run async → returns a job id; verify midclt call core.get_jobs (state SUCCESS).
2. stripacl does NOT remove DENY; full dacl replacement does
options.stripacl:true reported SUCCESS but left the owner@ DENY ACE intact. Only passing a complete dacl array works — setacl treats it as a full REPLACE of the ACL.
NFSv4 DENY overrides ALLOW (the corrupt-object trap)
A file owned by uid 950 carrying owner@ DENY READ_DATA=True cannot be read by uid 950 itself. Git then reports loose object ... corrupt — this is ACL, not data damage (data intact; root reads fine).
Diagnostic trap: git fsck under root is clean, but fetch/push under the owning uid fails → ACL, not corruption.
Broken files often show POSIX mode 40 (r--------); healthy objects 750.
Repair / cross-container recipe (linuxserver media stack)
Goal: all containers run under ONE uid (950) so transmission→radarr/sonarr→jellyfin all read each other's files.
- transmission: add
PUID=950 PGID=950to env indocker-compose.yml. It mountsstorage→/mnt/storage, download-dir/mnt/storage/Downloads. - radarr/sonarr/prowlarr/jellyfin compose: add
PUID=950 PGID=950to each (retainTZ). - linuxserver s6 images (Entrypoint
/init,/etc/s6-overlay) honor PUID/PGID natively. Default (unset) = runs root → creates root-owned files that 950-services can't read → always set PUID/PGID. - Recreate from proper folder:
cd /mnt/RED_2TB/docker/<svc> && docker compose up -d(+--force-recreateif env changed). Verify daemon uid viaps auxinside container (process asabc/950 = applied). NOTEdocker exec id≠ daemon uid. - Simple datasets: recursive POSIX
chown -R 950:950+chmodunder root SUFFICE (ACLs were trivial). Use midclt/ACL only when non-trivial ACEs present (checkfilesystem.getacl→trivial:true). - Bare git repo with
owner@ DENYon objects → full dacl replacement recursively (perms JSON like above).
GOTCHA 3 — root dataset traverse (Permission denied despite clean file ACL)
After chown-ing all leaf dirs/files to 950, if a service still gets Permission denied reading /storage/Movies/... (or jellyfin FFmpeg exit 243), check the root of the dataset /mnt/RED_2TB/storage itself. In the restore it stayed 921:921 with owner@/group@ ALLOW but everyone@ EXECUTE=False. uid 950 (not owner, not in gid-921-group) falls under everyone@ → cannot traverse past the root into the tree, even though every nested ACL is clean. Fix (root):
chown 950:950 /mnt/RED_2TB/storage
chmod 750 /mnt/RED_2TB/storage # rwxr-x---: gid 950 = truenas_admin (containers' group) gets r-x traverse
Kernel needs EXEC (traverse) on EVERY path component. Diagnostic via setpriv --reuid=950 ... ls shows Permission denied on a dir whose getacl looks clean → suspect root/parent traverse. stat via root shows clean 770 but uid 950 can't ls.
GOTCHA 4 — transmission "all torrents No Data Found" after data migration
If every transmission torrent shows error 3: No Data Found right after a container recreate/pool migration:
- Check:
docker exec -ufine to read? downloadDir & files present? If files ARE there and readable as uid 950, the error is likely stale from daemon startup while traverse was blocked (see GOTCHA 3). torrent-verifyon a single torrent does NOT clear it. Fix is trivial & non-destructive:
docker restart transmission
On restart the daemon re-validates → torrents clear (e.g. 254/255 instantly). Leftover #1 → Verify Local Data in Web UI.
Docker network persistency (per-service compose)
docker network connect <net> <container>is LOST on recreate → declare<net>in the service's composenetworks:.- Caddy must co-own a network with its reverse-proxy target. transmission Web UI works because caddy is ALSO in
transmission_default; radarr↔transmission works because both inmedia_net. external: truenetworks (media_net/caddy_default) aren't created by compose — if they vanish (pool rebuild),docker network create media_net.
Containers / uid summary (as of 2026-09-02, TrueNAS "Taiga")
- prowlarr/radarr/sonarr/jellyfin: all running, all daemons under uid 950, project
arr. - transmission: PUID/PGID=950, in networks
media_net+transmission_default(both external). - Radarr/sonarr/jellyfin mount
/mnt/RED_2TB/storageas/storage(NOT/mediaas on Kraken) → set radarr root-folder accordingly.