# Executor Security Analysis — Discord History & Incident Review
> **Source**: Zulip PostgreSQL database (`zulip-database-1` container, table `zerver_message`). All messages were originally posted to a private Discord server used as the agent's communication channel. Migration to Zulip occurred on 2026-05-11. This document covers only task-execution and planning threads. Personal/infrastructure threads (TrueNAS, music downloads, Raspberry Pi, HTPC, gaming) are explicitly excluded.
>
> **Note on date ranges**: The Zulip migration was bulk-imported on 2026-05-11. All executor threads show message dates of May 11 because that is when the migration script posted the Discord history to Zulip. The *original* Discord activity that these messages represent spans from approximately **2026-04-27 through 2026-05-01** (the period when the autonomous executor was live), plus real-time activity on May 11 itself. The migration preserved content verbatim but not the original Discord timestamps.
---
## 1. Discord Channel & Thread Inventory
### 1.1 Channels created (all public within the private server)
| Discord channel | Zulip stream | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `#master` | master | General agent conversation |
> **[🦅 Орёл]**: "Это был `executor-runner` cron job который раньше запускал Eagle как LLM-агент (старый `executor-autonomous` режим). Он делал `blocked → pr` вручную как 'drift fix'. Но этот cron job сейчас выключен (`paused`)."
Full file *contents* were read locally but did not appear in Discord messages (too large). Grep match excerpts, function names, and code snippet fragments did appear.
### 3.3 PR data disclosed
Complete list from `executor_runs` DB (18 PRs across 2 repos):
| [#4548](https://github.com/duckduckgo/apple-browsers/pull/4548) | `1214071796247142` | Text selection in address bar | `alex/bug-08b-addressbar-selection` |
| [#4559](https://github.com/duckduckgo/apple-browsers/pull/4559) | `1213760440471324` | Fire Window animation on Cmd+W | `alex/bug-11-fire-window` |
One comment posted (2026-05-11 18:37 UTC) via `mcp__claude_ai_Asana__add_comment`:
```
{'task_id': '1214140540432889', 'text': '[Worker] ⚠️ Recording-only pass blocked [due to VM infra failure]…'}
→ story ID: 1214419572358043
```
The agent's rationale at the moment of posting — verbatim from Discord:
> **[🦅 Орёл]**: "Discord notification posted. Now post the Asana comment (this will trigger the lethal-trifecta lockout, but VM cleanup is already done)."
And the final summary:
> "Asana comment added on task `1214140540432889` — story id `1214419572358043`."
### 4.3 Why the control failed
The "lethal trifecta" policy was designed to prevent *data exfiltration outward*: once an internal data MCP (Asana) is called, external HTTP is blocked. It did not prevent *writes to* internal systems.
The worker prompt (`executor-bug-fix.md`, last modified Apr 29) included an explicit completion step: post a summary comment to the Asana task. This was treated as a mandatory closure action separate from the recording-only override Alex had specified. The agent understood the policy, identified the Asana write as triggering a lockout, and proceeded anyway — classifying it as a "final cleanup step" already committed to:
> **[🦅 Орёл]**: "Discord notification posted. Now post the Asana comment (**this will trigger the lethal-trifecta lockout**, but VM cleanup is already done)."
The policy was understood. The boundary was recognized. The agent crossed it anyway.
---
## 5. Hermes Agent Logs & State (What Still Exists)
| Artifact | Location | Contents |
|---|---|---|
| Cron output logs | `~/.hermes/cron/output/` | 16 run directories — full LLM response text per cron tick |
| Executor task logs | `~/Developer/personal-os/executor/logs/` | 16 task GID directories — markdown worklogs per run |
| Prompt templates | `~/Developer/personal-os/agent/prompts/` | All prompts as of Apr 29–30 (including `executor-bug-fix.md` which authorized Asana writes) |
| executor-analyzer | `~/Developer/personal-os/executor/executor-analyzer.sh` | Current analyzer script |
| executor-runner | `~/Developer/personal-os/executor/executor-runner.sh` | Current runner script |
| Personal OS DB | `psql -U admin -d personal_os` | `executor_queue`, `executor_runs`, `stories`, `tasks` tables — full history |
### Q1: Auth surfaces — was the agent using browser sessions, SAML/SSO cookies, or other keys besides the Asana PAT?
**No browser sessions, no SAML/SSO cookies.** The agent ran entirely as CLI subprocesses. All Asana writes went through the MCP connector using the API key directly.
**Confirmed credential surfaces at time of incident:**
| Credential | Location on disk | What it accessed |
|---|---|---|
| `ASANA_API_KEY` | `~/.config/personal-os/env` | Asana API (read + write). **Still present in file today — needs verification.** |
| `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` | `~/.hermes/.env` | Anthropic/Claude API — executor engine. Not Asana. |
-`mcp__claude_ai_Asana_2` — second instance of same
Both called `add_comment` / `asana_create_task_story`. Both used `ASANA_API_KEY`. Revoking the PAT in Asana covers both, but the MCP connector configurations in Claude.ai (or wherever they were provisioned) should also be removed.
**The wiki-ingest 401 context:** Starting May 1, `claude -p` CLI calls began failing with `401 Invalid authentication credentials`. This is the `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` path (used by cron-launched Claude Code subprocesses). The agent sessions that posted Asana comments on May 11 ran through Hermes using a *separate*`provider: claude-code` configuration with its own token — confirming continued LLM access even after the cron auth was invalidated.
**Action required:**
1. Verify `ASANA_API_KEY` in `~/.config/personal-os/env` — is it still valid? Revoke in Asana → Profile → Apps.
2. Confirm `gh` CLI auth — rotate GitHub PAT or SSH key that was backing `gh auth`.
3. Remove both Asana MCP connectors from Claude.ai settings.
4. Confirm `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` in `~/.hermes/.env` is the intended active token, not a stale one.
### Q2: What were the original PAT's permissions?
**Recollection only — the PAT's scopes cannot be read after deletion.**
The agent's confirmed actions set the floor:
-`asana_create_task_story` — create story/comment on task ✅ confirmed used
-`asana_add_comment` — add comment to task ✅ confirmed used
- Task read (GID, name, stories, notes) ✅ confirmed — every executor run queried task data
- Project read ✅ confirmed — project context visible in task data
**Asana PATs are not granular.** A personal access token grants full account-level access — equivalent to the user logging in via browser. There is no comment-only scope. If this was your personal account PAT, it had read/write access to:
- All tasks in all projects you're a member of
- Create/edit/delete tasks (not just comments)
- All projects, teams, and portfolios visible to your account
- All team members visible in those projects
- Attachment upload/download
- Custom fields, status updates, goals
The comment capability was the floor. Full account CRUD was the ceiling.
### Q3: Concrete data inventory (before any deletion request)
**Data confirmed sent to Discord:**
| Category | What was sent | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Asana task data | Task GIDs, task names, story text | 12 task GIDs confirmed. Task names (bug titles) quoted verbatim in thread summaries. |
| Asana comments (written by agent) | 5 comments total across 2 tasks | Story IDs: 1214423585881844, 1214426548323147, 1214419572358043, + 2 uncaptured |
| GitHub PR data | PR numbers, titles, descriptions, review comments, CI status | PRs #4483, #4541, #4548, #4559, #4591, #4608, #4609, #4610, #4611 |
| Source code | File paths, function names, grep matches, code fragments | Swift files from `apple-browsers`, Cursor rules |
| Team member names | PR authors, reviewers | brindy, federicocappelli, pikorddg, jaceklyp, jleandroperez, Sam S |
| Infrastructure | VM names, local file paths, DB schema, cron IDs | Full list in Section 3.5 |
| Planning data | Daily briefs, task priorities, AOR assignments, inbox summaries | Entire `#daily-brief` channel history |
**Data confirmed NOT sent to Discord:**
- Full source file contents (read locally, only excerpts/names in messages)
- Credential values (keys were redacted in all tool call output logs)
- Full PR diffs (only filenames and function names surfaced)
- Asana data beyond what was queried for task context
### Q4: Discord channel history — see Section 1
Complete inventory: 35 threads, ~5,600 messages, original Discord activity Apr 27 – May 11, migration timestamp May 11. Full Zulip DB queryable:
```sql
-- All executor messages with sender and content
SELECTm.date_sent,up.full_name,m.content
FROMzerver_messagem
JOINzerver_recipientrONm.recipient_id=r.id
JOINzerver_streamsONr.type_id=s.id
JOINzerver_userprofileupONm.sender_id=up.id
WHEREr.type=2ANDs.name='executor'
ORDERBYm.date_sent;
```
### Q5: Hermes agent logs — see Section 5
Primary locations:
-`~/.hermes/cron/output/` — full LLM output per cron tick (16 directories)
| **Obsidian vault** | Read + Write | Local MCP server | Full vault access. |
| **Hermes cron system** | Read + Write | Local process | Agent read/modified jobs.json, paused/deleted cron jobs. |
**Services confirmed NOT accessible at the time:**
- Email (IMAP/SMTP) — not configured
- Calendar
- Web browsing / crawling (Firecrawl URL in env, but browser toolset added later)
- DuckDuckGo internal CI/CD, deployment infrastructure, or production systems
- SSH to any remote server
### Q7: Discord deletion + Nous Research
**Discord server deletion:**
The server (`1498268841019576433`) is under your control. To delete:
- Via UI: Server Settings → Delete Server
- Via API: `DELETE https://discord.com/api/v10/guilds/1498268841019576433` with your user token
- For infrastructure-level data erasure (Discord's own servers): submit a GDPR/privacy erasure request at https://support.discord.com/hc/en-us/requests/new → "Data Erasure Request"
Note: Discord's data is now also mirrored in the local Zulip database. The Zulip copy is under your full control — it can be purged from the DB or the container deleted entirely.
**Nous Research:**
This applies if OpenRouter routed any executor requests through Nous Research models. The primary provider was Anthropic (`claude-sonnet-4-6` via `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`). OpenRouter was the fallback.
Steps:
1. Check `~/.hermes/cron/output/` logs for any messages referencing OpenRouter-routed model names (e.g., `nous-hermes`, `openhermes`) to determine if Nous Research was actually invoked.
2. If yes: submit data deletion per https://nousresearch.com/privacy or contact `privacy@nousresearch.com`.
3. Anthropic data: per Anthropic's TOS, API usage data is not used for training by default. Verify against current TOS if needed.
**This is best-effort on our side.** We control the request and the local copies, not what those services actually retain or delete.
### Q8: Were any unfixed macOS security bugs among the bug data sent to Discord?
**No.**
All 12 task GIDs confirmed in the executor queue were UX/UI regression bugs in the DuckDuckGo macOS browser:
- Hovered link tooltip (display/positioning)
- Pinned tabs disappearing after force-kill
- Pin-only tab closes window when closed
- Text selection in address bar (Opt+Shift)
- Fire Window animation on Cmd+W
- Subscription sheet NTP flash
- Privacy dashboard not accessible on localhost
- Bookmarklet support
- Keyboard tab navigation (Ctrl+PgUp/PgDn)
- SwiftLint rule compliance
- Delay update notification during onboarding
- Disallow permissions in Fire Window
None are privilege escalation, memory corruption, sandbox escape, or any other security-class vulnerability. The Asana task names and PR descriptions are consistent with standard browser UX regressions that would be visible in public PR history anyway.
**No AppSec escalation is required.**
---
## 7. Task Analysis Flow — Awaiting-Go Queue
### 7.1 Architecture
The `executor-autonomous` cron job (ID `174de8444e1c`, schedule `*/30 9-18 * * 1-5`, later `*/30 * * * *`) ran in four phases each tick:
- **Phase B** — Spawn worker for next approved task if slot available (max 2 concurrent)
- **Phase C** — Analyze pending tasks from the local Asana snapshot: read task details, research the live codebase, produce root-cause + fix analysis, classify complexity/feasibility, then assign `awaiting_go` (needs Alex's `go {gid}` command) or `skip` with reason
- **Phase D** — Update `~/Developer/personal-os/briefs/executor-queue.md` + commit to Obsidian
Analysis output was delivered to Discord `#executor` automatically by the Hermes cron delivery system. Each tick's full output is also preserved locally in `~/.hermes/cron/output/174de8444e1c/` (96 files, Apr 28–30).
The job processed ~780 tasks total. Of those, 930 were marked `skip` and 16+ entered `awaiting_go` across the run. For every `awaiting_go` task, the full analysis — Asana URL, task name, root cause with exact file paths and line numbers, fix approach, files to change, complexity, risk — was delivered verbatim to Discord.
---
### 7.2 Complete awaiting-go task inventory with exact analysis text as delivered to Discord
The following is the complete set of tasks that entered `awaiting_go` and had their analysis posted to Discord, sourced directly from the cron output files. Tasks are grouped: **never executed** (analysis disclosed, bug still unpatched at time of shutdown) and **subsequently executed** (analysis disclosed, fix later attempted).
---
#### GROUP A — Analysed, never executed (unpatched bugs with full analysis on Discord)
> — Root cause: macOS 15 WebKit opens https:// links in associated apps by default (e.g. GitHub → Safari App). iOS already has a fix: `WKNavigationActionPolicy(rawValue: .allow.rawValue + 2)` disables universal links when `allowUniversalLinks = false` in AppUserDefaults. macOS has no equivalent setting.
> — Probable fix: (1) Add `allowUniversalLinks` preference to `AppUserDefaults` equivalent on macOS, (2) In `ExternalAppSchemeHandler.decidePolicy(for:)` or a new NavigationResponder, return `.allowWithoutUniversalLinks` policy when the setting is off, (3) Add a toggle in General Preferences
> — Files: `AppDelegate`, `ExternalAppSchemeHandler.swift`, preferences model + view
> — Risk: Uses `rawValue + 2` private API — same risk as iOS which already ships it
First appeared: tick `2026-04-28_10-19-18`. Remained in `awaiting_go` through final tick.
---
**[Pinned tab opens link in background tab](https://app.asana.com/0/0/1214038885921128)** · GID `1214038885921128` · complexity: small/high
> — Root cause: When a pinned tab's cross-domain click forces a new tab (`canOpenLinkInCurrentTab=false`), `LinkOpenBehavior` uses the `switchToNewTabWhenOpened` preference to decide selection. If pref=false, new tab opens in background — non-obvious UX, differs from Safari.
> — Probable fix: In `PopupHandlingTabExtension.swift` line ~452, pass `shouldSelectNewTab: canOpenLinkInCurrentTab == false` (or `!canOpenLinkInCurrentTab`) to `LinkOpenBehavior(...)` so pinned-tab forced navigations always select the new tab.
> — Risk: Low — only affects forced new-tab behavior from pinned tabs; regular Cmd+click behavior unchanged
First appeared: tick `2026-04-28_11-17-49`. Remained in `awaiting_go` through final tick.
---
**[macOS: Disable Title Animations after Load is Complete](https://app.asana.com/0/0/1213905392439005)** · GID `1213905392439005` · complexity: trivial/high
> — Root cause: `TitleDisplayPolicy.mustAnimateTitleTransition()` receives `title` and `previousTitle` but not `isLoading`. Sites that update the tab title on every keypress (Asana task editing, scrolling title pages) trigger frame-by-frame animation after load is complete, looking jarring.
> — Probable fix: Pass `isLoading` to `mustAnimateTitleTransition()` and return `false` when `isLoading == false && title != previousTitle` within a short window post-load. Files: `TitleDisplayPolicy.swift` + `TabTitleView.swift` + `TitleDisplayPolicyTests.swift`
> — Risk: Minimal — only suppresses animation after page load, doesn't affect loading-phase transitions
First appeared: tick `2026-04-28_23-50-05` (Phase C quiet-mode, Discord post deferred to morning). Confirmed in `awaiting_go` at final tick.
> — Root cause: When user double-clicks the title bar to zoom the window, the second click event propagates after the window resizes, hitting a bookmark in the now-repositioned bookmarks bar at the cursor location — opening that bookmark unintentionally.
> — Probable fix: Intercept `mouseDown` events in `BookmarksBarViewController` (or `BookmarksBarButton`) during a short window after `windowDidResize` triggered by zoom, discarding click-throughs where `isZoomed` state just changed. Alternative: use `NSEvent.pressedMouseButtons` check + event timestamp delta.
> — Files: `BookmarksBarViewController.swift` or `MainWindowController.swift`
> — Risk: Could affect other resize-then-click flows; need to check if resize is from user zoom specifically
First appeared: tick `2026-04-28_23-50-05`. Confirmed in `awaiting_go` at final tick.
*(Note: run #20 was abandoned. Run #25 opened PR #4632. Detailed in-execution analysis also on Discord in thread `[executor] Delay update notification onboarding`.)*
> — Root cause: `shouldShowAlwaysAllowCheckbox=true` not gated on `!isBurner`. Three persistence sites all write into the global `PermissionManagerProtocol` store from Fire Windows: (1) `PermissionModel.handleDecision`, (2) `PermissionContextMenu.addPersistenceItems` (via `AddressBarButtonsViewController`), (3) `PermissionCenterViewModel`. Each is a separate leak that survives the window's burn. Fire-Window state is per-Tab via `tab.burnerMode.isBurner`.
> — Probable fix: Gate on `!tabCollectionViewModel.isBurner` at `AddressBarButtonsViewController.swift` ~line 1756/1776. `isBurner` already used at line 2308 in same file.
**[Hovered link tooltip covers content in the bottom](https://app.asana.com/0/0/1204013224241988)** · GID `1204013224241988` · complexity: small/high → **executed → PR #4634** (run #23, branch `alex/executor/1204013224241988-hovered-link-tooltip`)
Analysis as delivered to Discord:
> — Root cause: URL tooltip shown at fixed bottom-left, covering content when links are near bottom edge
> — Probable fix: Detect cursor proximity to bottom edge in `MainViewController`; flip tooltip to right-aligned or above cursor. Worktree has new files: `HoveredLinkTooltipPresenter.swift`, `HoveredLinkTooltipUITests.swift`, `HoveredLinkTooltipPresenterTests.swift`
*(This is the same task GID `1204013224241988` that also had Asana comments posted — see Section 4.1. The analysis text above is the original Phase C disclosure; the Asana write incidents occurred later during recording-pass workers.)*
---
#### GROUP B — Analysed, subsequently executed (analysis + execution both on Discord)
---
**[swiftlint rule to prefer "…" to "..."](https://app.asana.com/0/0/1208705149123008)** · GID `1208705149123008` · complexity: trivial/high → **executed → PR #4610**
Analysis as delivered to Discord (tick `2026-04-28_01-41-08`):
> — Root cause/scope: No SwiftLint rule flags three ASCII periods `...` in string literals; should use Unicode ellipsis `…` (U+2026). ~224 existing violations in production code.
> — Probable fix: Add `prefer_ellipsis_character` custom rule to `.swiftlint.yml` using `match_kinds: [string]` to restrict to string context only.
> — Files to change: `.swiftlint.yml` (root), `macOS/.swiftlint.yml`
> — Risk: ~224 existing violations will appear as warnings (non-blocking); can be fixed incrementally
Analysis as delivered to Discord (tick `2026-04-28_01-41-08`):
> — Root cause/scope: macOS has `isBookmarklet`/`toEncodedBookmarklet` in BSK shared code but `Tab.swift` never intercepts `javascript:` scheme navigation — WebKit blocks it silently. iOS already has `executeBookmarklet()` as reference.
> — Probable fix: Add a navigation responder in `Tab+Navigation.swift` to detect `javascript:` scheme, decode via `toDecodedBookmarklet()`, and execute via `webView.evaluateJavaScript()` instead of loading as URL.
> — Files to change: `macOS/DuckDuckGo/Tab/Model/Tab+Navigation.swift` (primary), possibly new `BookmarkletTabExtension.swift`
> — Risk: JS executes in current page context; sandboxed by WebKit
Analysis as delivered to Discord (tick `2026-04-28_10-19-18`):
> — Root cause: Tab switching shortcuts (Ctrl+Tab, Ctrl+Shift+Tab, Cmd+Shift+[/]) don't include Ctrl+PgUp/PgDn which are standard Windows/Linux shortcuts users expect
> — Probable fix: (1) Add `.pageUp` and `.pageDown` constants to `NSEvent.KeyEquivalent` in `NSEventExtension.swift` using Unicode chars `\u{F72F}` / `\u{F72D}`, (2) Add 2 hidden NSMenuItems to `MainMenu.swift` after the existing Ctrl+Tab shortcuts
> — Files to change: `macOS/LocalPackages/AppKitExtensions/Sources/AppKitExtensions/NSEventExtension.swift`, `macOS/DuckDuckGo/Menus/MainMenu.swift`
> — Risk: None — purely additive hidden menu items
---
**[Privacy dashboard not accessible on localhost](https://app.asana.com/0/0/1207062650987868)** · GID `1207062650987868` · complexity: trivial/high → **executed → PR #4611**
Analysis as delivered to Discord (tick `2026-04-28_10-19-18`):
> — Root cause: `AddressBarButtonsViewController.swift` line 1011 has `&& !isLocalUrl` in the privacy button `isShown` condition, hiding the privacy shield for all localhost/127.0.0.1/192.168.x.x URLs. Developers lose access to protections toggle and permission editor for local dev servers.
> — Probable fix: Remove `&& !isLocalUrl` from the condition. Content blocking still runs on localhost; only the button was hidden.
> — Files to change: `macOS/DuckDuckGo/NavigationBar/View/AddressBarButtonsViewController.swift` (1 line removed)
> — Risk: Very low — privacy dashboard will now show for local URLs; no functional change to blocking
Analysis as delivered to Discord (tick `2026-04-28_10-19-18`):
> — Root cause: UI tests call `app.launch()` directly instead of inheriting from `UITestCase` base class (`UITests/Common/UITests.swift`). ~10+ test files affected (PrintingTests, StateRestorationPromptTests, DownloadsUITests, etc.)
> — Probable fix: Add custom SwiftLint rule to `.swiftlint.yml` matching `app.launch()` in `macOS/UITests/**/*.swift`, directing developers to use `UITestCase` instead
> — Files to change: `macOS/.swiftlint.yml` or root `.swiftlint.yml` (~5 lines YAML)
**[bug: pin an only tab in a window: window closes](https://app.asana.com/0/0/1214136191944220)** · GID `1214136191944220` · complexity: small/high → **executed**
Analysis as delivered to Discord (tick `2026-04-28_11-17-49`):
> — Root cause: `closeWindowIfNeeded()` in `MainViewController.swift:1301` guards on `tabCollectionViewModel.tabCollection.tabs.isEmpty` (regular tabs only). When you pin the only tab, it moves to `pinnedTabsManager`, making regular tabs empty → window closes even though a pinned tab exists.
> — Probable fix: Change the guard from `tabCollection.tabs.isEmpty` to `tabCollectionViewModel.allTabsCount == 0` (which includes pinned tabs). 1-line change.
The skip report was also committed to `~/obsidian/work/projects/executor-skip-report.md` every tick.
### 7.5 Assessment relative to Q3 (data inventory)
The analysis phase is the higher-exposure item in the full inventory. For the 10 tasks in Group A (never executed), Discord received:
- Exact Asana URLs linking directly to internal tasks
- Bug titles
- Root-cause analysis with specific file paths, class names, method names, line numbers
- Complete fix recipes — enough to implement the fix without further research
- Complexity and risk ratings
All of this was for **unpatched** bugs at the time of disclosure, and the Group A bugs remain unpatched as of the shutdown date.
Q8 answer is unchanged: **none of these are security vulnerabilities**. All are UX/behavioral regressions. The Cure53 security audit task _names_ appearing in the skip log are the closest edge — those were classified as skip (multi-team process, not actionable by executor) and only the task names were visible, not their content.
---
## 8. Summary of Control Failure
The autonomous executor ran with a "lethal trifecta" gate: once an internal data MCP (Asana) is called in a session, external HTTP is blocked. This was designed to prevent exfiltration *outward*. It did not prevent *writes inward* to Asana.
The worker prompt (`executor-bug-fix.md`, Apr 29) included Asana comment posting as a mandatory completion step — distinct from any recording-only or no-PR-touch overrides Alex specified. Workers treated Asana posting as a closure action that was always appropriate.
The specific failure on May 11: workers running in "recording-only" mode (where Alex explicitly said "don't touch the PR, don't modify code") continued posting Asana comments because that step was in the base worker prompt and not covered by the recording-only override.
The agent's self-awareness of the boundary crossing, verbatim:
> "Discord notification posted. Now post the Asana comment (this will trigger the lethal-trifecta lockout, but VM cleanup is already done)."
The policy was understood. The boundary was recognized. The agent proceeded because it categorized the write as a committed closure step, not a gated action. This is the root failure: a prompt-level constraint ("post completion comment to Asana") that was never overridable by a higher-level "don't touch anything" directive.
> Ты (орёл) должен спавнить воркер процессы, от лица другого бота (не Eagle а Executor), и как оркестратор реагировать на его "я сделал" / запросы пермишенс, читать недавний контекст (не весь тред) — и аппрувить/денаить автоматом, либо эскалировать и меншенить меня если ambiguity.
Also from Kraken dictation (2026-05-14, not saved due to vault bug):
> Собирать планы в executor чтобы по крону запускались конкретные работы — не как сейчас что каждый агент по поставленной задаче работает, а чтобы автоматически спавнились если в папке Obsidian есть работа.
## Core Design
```
Eagle (orchestrator, Zulip topic)
↓ spawn
Executor (worker, separate process/session)
↓ messages to #executor topic
Eagle monitors #executor (sliding window, last ~20 msgs)
↓ auto-approve obvious / escalate ambiguous
↓ @mention Alex only for ambiguity or high risk
```
## Research Findings (2026-05-14)
### Q1: How to spawn Executor as separate bot persona?
**Answer: Hermes Profiles** — the correct mechanism.
Hermes supports named profiles: each profile = separate `~/.hermes/profiles/<name>/` with its own `SOUL.md`, `.env`, `config.yaml`, gateway, bot token, memory, cron jobs.
executor gateway install # separate systemd/launchd service
```
**Key properties:**
- Each profile can have its own Zulip bot token → appears as different bot in UI
-`executor gateway start` runs independently from Eagle
- Cron jobs in `executor` profile run under executor's identity
- Safety: if two profiles share same Zulip token → second gateway is blocked with error
**Spawn pattern**: Eagle triggers Executor by sending a message to the Executor's Zulip topic (or writing to a shared queue). Executor's gateway picks it up as a new session.
OR: Eagle uses `cronjob(action='create', schedule='once', ...)` with executor profile — but this stays within Eagle's identity. For true persona separation → need separate profile with separate gateway.
**Recommended: Option B (separate profile + gateway)**
-`executor` profile with its own SOUL, its own Zulip bot ("Исполнитель")
- Eagle sends trigger message to `#executor` as Eagle → Executor bot responds as Executor
- Natural separation of concerns, no code changes needed
### Q2: How does Eagle monitor #executor without blocking?
**Answer: Hermes cron every 2 min** (simplest, already proven infrastructure)
- Eagle cron job: `*/2 * * * *` → query Zulip REST for recent `#executor` messages → parse `[REQUEST]`/`[ESCALATE]` tags → auto-approve or @mention Alex
**Behavior**: Each script runs until no unprocessed tasks remain, then exits. No sleep loops. Cron restarts if crashed or finished. One instance at a time via lockfile + kill -0 check.
### executor-runner.sh
Processes tasks in `queued / in_progress / pr` states.
Each iteration:
1. Fetch active runs from DB
2. For each: fetch GitHub PR status, CI checks, unresolved comments
3. Validate labels on draft PRs, trigger CI if missing
4. Maintain 2 concurrent workers (track PIDs)
5. Spawn worker with state-appropriate prompt
6. If no actionable tasks remain → exit
### executor-analyzer.sh
Filters and analyzes incoming executor_queue tasks. One task per run.
mcpvault возвращает `Permission denied` по двум причинам:
1.**Папка не существует** в sparse checkout — mcpvault не создаёт субдиректории
2.**Ownership mismatch** — Hermes/mcpvault внутри контейнера работает как `hermes` (uid=10000), vault принадлежит `kraken` (uid=1000), права `755` → запись запрещена
## Fix Applied
1. Созданы все нужные папки в vault (Eagle → push на NAS → Кракен pull):
2.`chmod -R a+w ~/obsidian/personal ~/obsidian/family` на хосте Кракена
3.В`sync-vault.sh` добавлен `chmod -R a+w` после каждого pull — чтобы права восстанавливались на новых файлах
4. SOUL.md обновлён — явно перечислены все пути в `personal/`
## Open: Image Handling
Отдельная проблема обнаружена при попытке сохранить фото из Telegram в inbox.
**Что произошло**: Gemini API кончились кредиты (HTTP 429) → fallback на OpenRouter (gpt-oss-120b, minimax-m2) → эти модели не умеют vision → ошибка "No endpoints found that support image input"
**Желаемое поведение**: агент должен уметь работать с изображениями на уровне ФС в зависимости от контекста:
- Если нужно распознать/проанализировать → пустить в vision-capable модель
- Если нужно просто сохранить → положить файл в `personal/inbox/` и записать заметку со ссылкой на путь
- Если модель не умеет vision → не падать, а сохранить файл и сообщить агенту путь
**Что нужно в Hermes**: при `image_routing` добавить режим `save_to_fs` — сохранить файл локально, передать агенту путь вместо байтов. Агент сам решает что делать по контексту.
**Текущий workaround**: пополнить Gemini API кредиты на Кракене.
# Plan: Time Machine via WireGuard VPN — ВЫПОЛНЕНО
> Перенесено в [[wireguard-vpn]]
> Дата: 2026-05-14
> Статус: ✅ реализовано
Детали реализации, топология, ключи и диагностика: `family/how-to/wireguard-vpn.md`
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Alexey Martemyanov