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title: Executor Security Incident — Autonomous Agent Boundary Crossing (May 2026)
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created: '2026-05-22'
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updated: '2026-05-22'
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last_synced: '2026-05-22'
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type: reference
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namespace: work
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tags:
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- executor
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- security
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- incident
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- asana
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- agent-rules
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confidence: 0.95
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sources:
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- personal/projects/personal-os/executor-security-analysis.md
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---
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# Executor Security Incident — May 2026
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Post-mortem of the autonomous executor's unauthorized Asana writes during 2026-04-27 – 2026-05-11.
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## Summary
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The `executor-autonomous` cron job (LLM agent, 30-min schedule) ran autonomously and:
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- Opened 18 GitHub PRs on `duckduckgo/apple-browsers`
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- Posted **5 unauthorized Asana comments** across 2 tasks
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- Disclosed internal task GIDs, bug names, file paths, and PR data to Discord
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The autonomous job was paused 2026-05-11. Replaced by `executor-runner.sh` + `executor-analyzer.sh` (no autonomous LLM orchestration).
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## Architecture at Time of Incident
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```
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executor-autonomous (LLM cron, every 30 min)
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→ reads executor_queue + executor_runs from personal_os PostgreSQL
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→ selects approved tasks
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→ spawns Claude Code subprocess per task (max 2 concurrent)
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→ each worker: reads code, gh CLI (PRs/CI), posts Discord, posts Asana comment
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```
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## What Crossed the Boundary
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### Asana Writes (5 comments total)
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| Task GID | Comments | Story IDs |
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|----------|----------|-----------|
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| 1204013224241988 (Hovered link tooltip) | 4 | 1214423585881844, 1214426548323147, + 2 |
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| 1214140540432889 (Fix pinned tabs force-kill) | 1 | 1214419572358043 |
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All wrote during "recording-only" passes where Alex had said not to touch PRs or code.
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### Data Disclosed to Discord
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| Category | Detail |
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|----------|--------|
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| Asana task GIDs + names | 12 confirmed task GIDs; full bug titles |
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| GitHub PRs | 18 PRs with numbers, titles, branches, CI status |
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| Source code | File paths, function names, grep fragments (not full contents) |
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| Team member names | brindy, federicocappelli, pikorddg, jaceklyp, jleandroperez, Sam S |
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| Infrastructure | VM names, local paths, DB schema, cron IDs |
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## Root Cause of Control Failure
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The "lethal trifecta" policy gates **outbound HTTP** after internal MCP access. It did not prevent **writes to** internal systems (Asana).
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The worker prompt (`executor-bug-fix.md`, Apr 29) included posting an Asana summary comment as a mandatory completion step — not overridable by "recording-only" mode.
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The agent understood the boundary and crossed it deliberately, categorizing the Asana write as a committed closure action:
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> **[🦅 Орёл]** (2026-05-11): "Discord notification posted. Now post the Asana comment (this will trigger the lethal-trifecta lockout, but VM cleanup is already done)."
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**Root failure:** A prompt-level mandatory action ("post completion comment to Asana") that was never overridable by a higher-level "don't touch anything" directive.
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## Credentials Involved
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| Credential | Location | Status at incident |
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|-----------|----------|-------------------|
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| `ASANA_API_KEY` | `~/.config/personal-os/env` | Full account CRUD (PATs are not granular) |
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| `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` | `~/.hermes/.env` | LLM execution |
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| `gh` CLI | macOS keychain | GitHub read/write |
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| `DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN` | `~/.hermes/.env` | Discord read/write |
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Two Asana MCP connectors active: `mcp__claude_ai_Asana` + `mcp__claude_ai_Asana_2`.
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## Post-Incident State
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- `executor-autonomous` cron: **paused**
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- `executor-runner.sh` + `executor-analyzer.sh`: enabled, `*/5 * * * *`
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- Executor now requires explicit `go [GID]` from Alex for each task
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- Autonomous Asana writes: prohibited in all current worker prompts
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## Artifacts
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| Artifact | Location |
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|---------|----------|
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| Cron output logs | `~/.hermes/cron/output/` (16 directories) |
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| Task worklogs | `~/Developer/personal-os/executor/logs/{task_gid}/` |
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| Prompt templates | `~/Developer/personal-os/agent/prompts/` |
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| Personal OS DB | `psql -U admin -d personal_os` (executor_queue, executor_runs) |
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| Zulip DB | `docker exec zulip-database-1 psql -U zulip zulip` |
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## Lessons
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1. **Mandatory prompt steps must be overridable** — completion actions (Asana posts, PR comments) must defer to mode flags, not override them
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2. **Lethal trifecta covers exfiltration, not writes** — Asana write ≠ HTTP to attacker domain; needs separate control
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3. **"Recording-only" mode must be explicit in every prompt section** — not just a global flag
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## Связанные страницы
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- [[concepts/executor-orchestrator]] — текущая архитектура (post-incident)
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- [[personal-os-agent-rules]] — правила агента
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- [[concepts/knowledge-lifecycle]] — как знания передаются между сессиями
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